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INTRODUCTION
The violent separation of the Greeks and Muslims of Asia Minor from each
other in these years represents one of the most important turning points in the
region’s history, second, perhaps, only to the capture of Constantinople by
Turks four and a half centuries earlier. Yet, despite the very large number of
people involved and the huge disruptions it caused in the region, we seldom
think about the radical shift that must have taken place in the mentalities of the
people as they planned, instigated and participated in this momentous shuffle
that involved more than 1.5 million Greeks and Turks. We forget that the
communities that were separated in 1923 had been living together for centuries
and that even those boarding ships in Izmir and elsewhere would not have
dreamed that their departure would be permanent. Rather than exploring these
topics, what passes as analysis of these events is usually limits to justifying the
tragedy from the Turkish side or lamenting it from the Greek or Armenian
perspective.
To the Turks, 9 September 1922 was liberation day for Izmir, the
crowning event in their successful war of deliverance from the occupying Greek
and Allied Forces. School children in Turkey learn nothing of the forced
migration of millions of people; instead they read the celebratory accounts of
how “the enemy” was “dumped into the sea”1. Official versions of history insist
that there was no deliberate persecution of Greeks and Armenians under
Ottoman rule and that the difficulties these communities faced during the war
were unavoidable because of the chaotic circumstances of those years.
What is seen as a triumph for the Turkish nationalists was, of course, a
catastrophe for the Greeks. In 1922 the Greeks were forced to abandon one of
oldest centers of Hellenic civilization in Asia Minor and leave a city and a
region that had become a site of great commercial prosperity. The waves of
refugees from Anatolia presented a heavy burden on the small state of Greece
and the problems associated with settling these families remained unresolved
for most of the 1920s. In the Grecophile accounts of these disasters, part of the
blame goes to the misguided policies of the Greek government and part of it to
the wavering policies of the Great Powers. There is no doubt, however, who
was responsible for the material, physical, spiritual losses and pain the Greeks
and Armenians of western Anatolia suffered: “The destruction of Smyrna
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4happened, however, in 1922, and no act ever perpetrated by the Turkish race in
all its bloodstained
history, has been characterized by more brutal and lustful features, nor more
productive of worst forms of human sufferings inflicted on the defenseless and
unarmed,”2 wrote George Horton, the American Consul general to Izmir and a
man known for his deep Greek sympathies.
The two sides have such diametrically opposed perceptions of those
fateful years that even the accounts of well known events for which there is
ample eyewitness testimony do not agree with each other. For example, in
describing the fire that left Izmir in ruins, the Greek and Armenian survivors
report having seen “Turks taking bombs, gunpowder, kerosene and everything
necessary to start fires, in wagon-fulls...through the streets” in the Armenian
district.3 Pro-Turkish accounts, on the other hand, either ignore the whole
episode or claim that the Greeks had severed “all the rubber pipes of the fire
brigade”4 or that “[a]ctual culpability has never been proved”,5 or that “there
was in fact not one fire, but many,” some of them set by Christians, some by
Turks,6 or that “any description of uniformed Turkish soldiers lighting fires in
the city… may be assumed to be part of the fire-fightings rather than incendiary
attempts”.7
1. BEFORE THE FIRE: THE MYTH OF THE MILLETS
Whatever the sympathies of the authors, most explanations of ethnic conflict in
the Near East start with the millet system; that is, with the notion that Ottoman
society had consisted of neatly demarcated communities (so called millets) each
with a distinct language, culture, and religion, and living and working in
separate neighborhoods and villages. Even though the histories that are
sympathetic to the Greek or the Turkish perspectives use the notion of the millet
as representing a prototype for a primordial understanding of nations, they
differ in their perceptions of the relationship between the Ottoman state and
these communities.8 The Turkish versions project a benevolent image of the
Ottoman administration as a system of rule that gave its subject people
considerable autonomy to practice their religion and maintain their cultural
habits and characteristics.9 In this perspective, through the institution of millets,
the Ottoman state becomes responsible for protecting and preserving non-
Muslim religions and cultures in their domains. For Balkan historians, on the
other hand, millets were the depositories not only of the essential characteristics
of each community but also of the tremendous resentment these communities
felt for their suffering under the “Turkish/Muslim yoke” that oppressed them for
centuries.10 While they stand at opposite ends of an interpretive spectrum, both
of these versions seem to suggest that centuries of cross-community relations
5had not affected the essential characteristics of these millets in any significant
way.
6What gets lost in these competing explanations and claims is the fact that
Ottoman society resembled a kaleidoscope of numerous, overlapping and cross-
cutting relations and categories more than it did a neatly arranged pattern of
distinct elements.11 In addition to the Karamanlis, there were, in Anatolia,
Armenian-speaking Greeks who used Greek characters to write Armenian; in
Istanbul Greek speaking Jews who used the Hebrew alphabet to write Greek;
and Greeks who spoke Ladino.12 Turkish novelist Halit Ziya attended a Catholic
school that was established by the Spanish priests where he was assigned a
geography book written in Turkish with Armenian characters.13 The idea that
these communities could be easily identified, separated from each other, moved,
and relocated across long distances contradicted both the actual conditions and
the worldviews and expectations of the people who became the subjects of these
policies. Both in 1914 when they were relocated by the Young Turks, and in
1923, when they were exchanged, most of the Greeks expected their departure
to be temporary.14
To be sure, whether somebody was Muslim or not was a very important
criterion in the stratification of Ottoman society and, when all is said and done,
non-Muslims were considered to be the second-class citizens of the state. But
religion was only one of the markers Ottomans used to categorize their subjects.
They also referred ethnicity, tribal ties, Sufi affiliations, occupation, and
nomadism when identifying their subjects. These categories changed,
overlapped, or cut across each other and the Ottomans did not consistently favor
any one of them over the rest. Their approach was much more flexible. For
example, in earlier centuries, nomadism was central to the achievements of the
state, and hence, nomadic tribes were at the center of the empire’s initial
organization. But after the sixteenth century, as the establishment of a
bureaucratic administration became the central concern of the state, nomadic
tribes found themselves at the receiving end of some very harsh treatment,
especially if they resisted settlement.15 Underlying this administrative flux, was
a social fluidity which allowed people to convert, settle down, join or quit Sufi
orders, move in and out of cities (with the exception of Istanbul) and combine
nomadic and sedentary forms of agriculture. To make matters more
complicated, some of the converts, such as the dönmes (from Judaism) and
"crypto-Christians," were never completely accepted by the Muslim community
as genuine believers.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the changing conditions in
the eastern Mediterranean made the straightforward application of ethnic and
national categories there even more difficult. Starting in the 1830s, the region's
trade grew several times over, and Izmir became firmly established as a major
Mediterranean port placed at the center of a vast commercial network that
7extended outwards to other sites in Europe and inwards toward the sites of
cultivation and production in its hinterland. These conditions of economic
expansion entailed the even closer interaction of people of different ethnic and
religious backgrounds.
On all levels and in all occupational groups, western Anatolian society
was diverse and became even more so in the course of the nineteenth century.
There were Greek and Turkish peasants, non-Muslim and Muslim merchants;
Muslims who worked for foreign banks and for the Public Debt
Administration;16 Greek bandits who kidnapped Muslim notables; Muslim
notables who supported Muslim bandits; Muslim bandits who kidnapped
Muslim notables; and Muslim bandits who sought the mediation of Levantine
residents when they got into trouble with the state.17
The municipal council of Izmir created in 1868, provides a good example
of the degree to which the various ethnic and religious communities had
become intertwined in the nineteenth century. The council had twenty-four
members broken down as follows: six Muslims, five Greeks, three Armenians,
one Jew, and nine foreigners. Even the executive council which was to oversee
the day-to-day affairs of the city, had two Muslim and two non-Muslim
Ottoman members and four foreigners.18 Associations such as the Hilal-i Ahmer
Cemiyeti (Red Crescent Society), Sporting Club, and the Association of Turkish
and Greek Journalists maintained an ethnically mixed membership through the
period of the Greek occupation.19 Even some of the bands of brigands were
multiethnic in composition. One such band when it was captured in 1919 had 21
members 9 of them Greeks (Ottoman, four from Greece), six Turks, and two
Armenians.20
Izmir’s fire brigade was underwritten by the London Insurance Company
and included both non-Muslim and Muslim firefighters. During the great fire,
some from this brigade confronted the Turkish troops and accused them of
torching the buildings while the firefighters were trying to put out the flames.
To this, a soldier responded, “You have your orders and I have mine”21
According to one contemporary account, on September 10, “the Turkish
Military Governor, learning that there were still twelve Greeks in the fire
department, ordered their immediate expulsion and arrest”.22
Professor Konstantinos Karatheodeoris from Göttingen University
constitutes another example of the enduring complexities of loyalties and their
incompatibility with rigid boxes. He was hired by the Greek government to
establish the “Hellen University of Smyrna” in 1919. Karatheodoris’s father,
Kara Todori Pasa, had been a high ranking employee of the Ottoman Foreign
8Ministry and played a prominent role in the delegation that represented the
Ottoman Empire at the Berlin Conference in 1878.23
We can multiply the examples of the fluidity of the social, economic, and
ethnic categories in the Ottoman Empire, but this still leaves unanswered the
question of why these conditions could not be maintained, and why the conflict
in Asia Minor deteriorated so quickly into an ethnic conflict, with Greeks and
Armenians on one side and Muslim Turks on the other. The scale of killing,
destruction, and the numbers who were made homeless and exiled are too large
and the eyewitness accounts are too detailed and numerous to ignore as the
biased observations of one group or the other. A French officer described the
scene in Izmir on 13 September as follows: “The Armenian quarter is a charnel
house… In three days this rich quarter is entirely ravaged. The streets are
heaped with mattresses, broken furniture, glass, torn paintings…One sees
cadavers in front of the houses. They are swollen and some have exposed
entrails. The smell is unbearable and swarms of flies cover them…”24 On the
other side, Halide Edib, who accompanied the Turkish troops in western
Anatolia, recounts how the “Turkish army reached one city after another, only
to find it a heap of ashes; its population scattered, women half mad with grief,
digging at the stone heaps with their nails…Hell seemed to be on an earth in
which two peoples struggled, one for deliverance, another for destruction. There
was no quarter given on either side”.25
2. CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE
What made the people of western Anatolia rape, mutilate and kill their
neighbors with such impunity? Can there ever be a sufficient explanation for the
wanton destruction of lives and property that took place in this region during
the first two decades of the twentieth century? Part of the answer to this
question has to come from within the region where the killings and deportations
took place. In many instances people harassed, beat, forced out, and even shot
their neighbors precisely because they knew them. In doing so, they were
acting, not on behalf of some grandiose plan or under the impetus of a deep
hatred toward a specific ethnic or religious group, but to redress an insult or a
slight committed by a specific individual or family. Such acts of revenge played
a big part in the rapid deterioration of the relations between these communities,
first under the Greek occupation and then after the reestablishment of Turkish
rule. But this can only be a part of the explanation since we can also point to
many instances of Turkish villagers looking after the property of their Greek
neighbors when the latter were driven away to the islands in 1914, or Greek
peasants protecting their Turkish neighbors from the excesses of the regular and
irregular forces of the Greek army.26
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In any case, if all that took place were petty acts of revenge, the
destruction in western Anatolia would never have reached the level it did after
World War I. For the civic and economic networks in the region to fall apart
with the speed that they did, there had to have been a much more forceful and
sustained attack, and such an attack could come only from sources that were not
integral to these networks. To put it another way, the cosmopolitan and
prosperous networks that sustained Izmir were destroyed, not as a result of the
natural evolution and eventual clash of separate and inherently antagonistic
communities, but through the decisive intervention of three sets of forces whose
origins lay elsewhere.27 The first two of these consisted of the competing
ideologies of Greek and Turkish nationalisms and the third, the substantial
number of fighters who were either external or at best marginal to the civic
networks of western Anatolia.
3. TWO NATIONALISMS IN CONFLICT
Mutually exclusive and antagonistic as they were, the nationalist ideologies of
the Greeks and Turks were similar in one important respect: they were both
products of post-Enlightenment Europe and were shaped by the same internally
conflicting trends of thought concerning the history and the desired orientation
of their respective communities. In the case of Greek nationalism, there was, on
the one hand, the Hellenistic thesis that emphasized the importance of
reconnecting the Greeks with their history that was the source of classical
Western civilization.28 Many distinguished Greek and Grecophile scholars
became ardent followers of this line of thinking, contributing to the creation of
neo-Hellenic enlightenment that was influential not only among the Greeks but
also in Western Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This
line of thinking was very critical of the Orthodox Church. Adamantios Koraes,
who is considered to be a leading thinker of this school, wrote: "If the Graeco-
Roman Emperors had given to the education of the race a small part of that
attention which they gave to the multiplication of churches and monasteries,
they would not have betrayed the race to the rulers more benighted than
themselves”.29
No Greek nationalist could afford to turn his back on the east completely,
however. It was there that the Byzantine history was centered, the seat of the
Orthodox Church was located, and most importantly, an overwhelming majority
of ethnic Greeks continued to live until the first decades of the twentieth
century. The “Romeoic” thesis, which put more emphasis on this Eastern
heritage saw the history of the Greeks as deeply intertwined with the history of
the Eastern Church and regarded some aspects of Hellenistic enlightenment
with suspicion because of its pagan undertones.30 Both the Romeoic and
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Hellenic prescriptions for the future of the Greek nation had the same goal of
creating a unified state that would include all, or most of the ethnic Greeks of
the region. But their understanding of who the Greeks were and what the
character of the Greek state should be varied widely. These conflicting lines of
thinking pulled the Greek nationalism in opposite directions with equal force,
ultimately causing it to become immobile and inflexible. 31
Most ethnic Greeks, especially those in the diaspora had at best an
ambivalent attitude toward both strands of Greek nationalism. By using family
networks, ethnic ties, and other historical links that dated back many centuries
and extended far into Europe, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire had played a
key role in bringing about the commercial boom of the nineteenth century in the
eastern Mediterranean. What put them in such an advantageous position in these
networks were their multifarious links with other groups, their mobility, and the
expansive nature of their activities. From their perspective, confining or
focusing these activities within the boundaries of a small state was neither
practical nor desirable, especially if it had to happen at the expense of other
centers such as Izmir or Alexandria.
Even though the initial excitement of independence had attracted some
migration to the Kingdom of Greece, this did not last long and most of these
families returned to their homes after being disappointed in their prospects in
the new country.32 For example, “the town of Ayvalik, which was devastated
and depopulated in 1821 had by 1896 re-acquired an almost exclusively Greek
population of thirty-five thousand”33 In Izmir, the Greek population increased
from thirty thousand to seventy-five thousand between the 1830s and 1860s”.34
The wealth of Asia Minor continued to attract a steady stream of Greek
nationals to the region throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. The
partisans of the new state were unhappy with the cosmopolitanism of the Greek
communities of Anatolia; they appeared to be so removed from their heritage
that some of them did not even speak Greek. The nationalists saw the wealthy
families of Izmir and Istanbul as helping not the Greek cause but their own
interests and the interests of the Ottoman state. To correct this situation, some of
them organized campaigns to “Hellenize” these lost communities. These efforts
were not greeted with any enthusiasm by the locals, and for the most part they
failed.35
These feelings of resentment and suspicion played a large role in pushing
Greece into the two Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 and then into the occupation
of western Anatolia in 1919. While some in Greece believed that only by
uniting the wealthiest and the most successful parts of the Greek diaspora with
the new homeland could Greek nationalism succeed, others did not trust the
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highly cosmopolitan and liberal nature of the networks abroad, and they sought
to harness these to serve the interests of the new state.
As soon as the Greek army landed in western Anatolia the whole region
fell into chaos and became the site of an extremely destructive conflict that
lasted for three-years. There were close to 400,000 refugees from the Balkans
who had been settled in western and southern Anatolia between 1912 and
1919.36 These people were naturally apprehensive about the prospects of living
under the Greek rule from the beginning and resisted it as much as they could.
Their uncertainty was matched by the status of Anatolian Greeks who had been
expelled to the islands and to Greece by the Young Turk governments before
and during the Balkan wars. By the end of 1920, 126,000 of these were returned
and settled in western Anatolia by the Greek administration.37 According to
some estimates, at least 150,000 Muslims were left homeless as a result of the
resettlement of the Greek refugees.38 In addition to these massive movements
that shuffled and reshuffled the region’s population several times over, the
Greek invasion also forced the much more difficult and painful process of
untangling the intricate local relations that had connected various ethnic and
religious groups together. Greek youth who had been recruited into the Ottoman
army during World War I, primarily to work in labor battalions, were
“liberated” only to be drafted into the Greek army to fight their erstwhile friends
and neighbors. As the Greek army spread into the interior, the occupying forces
removed the Ottoman administrators from the upper echelons of the civil
administration and put Greeks in charge of the area. However, because these
officials were brought from Greece, most of them did not speak any Turkish,
which made it impossible for them to establish even the semblance of authority
in the first months of the occupation.39 In 1922, when the Greek army was
roundly defeated and forced to flee, they burned most of the villages and cities
in the interior, which in turn created the pretext for revenge among the Turkish
troops and Muslim residents in Izmir.40 In retrospect, it would not be an
exaggeration to claim that the only accomplishment of this profoundly
misguided policy was to galvanize the sentiments of exclusion within Turkish
nationalism and plant the very seeds of enmity that are often mentioned as the
cause of this conflict.
In ways that were no different from its Greek counterpart, Turkish
nationalism also contained some deep ambiguities at its core affecting not only
how the Turks thought of themselves and their history but also the policies they
implemented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The first, and
the most critical among these, had to do with the ethnic definition of Turks as a
community and a nation. Through the writings and activities of intellectuals
from Azerbaijan, Crimea, and the Volga region of Russia such as Ismail Bey
Gasprinski, Agaoglu Ahmet and Akçuraoglu Yusuf, Ottomans became aware of
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a community of ethnic Turks who were spread across a large territory extending
from the Mediterranean basin into Central Asia. This conception of Central
Asia as the font of Turkish civilization was reinforced by the influence of some
of the Sufi orders who had moved westward from central Asia over many
centuries.41 Another important tie to the east was established more circuitously,
by way of Europe, where exiled Ottoman intellectuals read the works of early
Orientalists who were interested in Central Asian cultures, Turkic tribes, and
languages.42 The translations of the works of these European scholars would be
used in the debates about the history and nature of Turkish identity especially in
the early decades of the twentieth century. There was, however, the obvious but
awkward reality that this wide and broad community of Turks who were
supposed to constitute a community had no real experience that linked them
with each other. The Muslim Turks in places like Izmir clearly had much more
in common with their Greek or Armenian neighbors than they did with their
cousins in the Caucuses, along the Volga, and in Central Asia. Nevertheless, the
idea of a distinct Turkish race found its way into new Turkish nationalist
thought and was melded into a historical narrative that took some liberties with
facts but served the requirements of the time very well.43
Like its Greek counterpart, Turkish nationalism also had a somewhat
uncertain and wavering relationship with religion. In the course of the Greek-
Turkish war, Mustafa Kemal deliberately appealed to Muslims in Anatolia. He
particularly benefited from the help of the Sufi tarikats during the war and
accepted and used until his death the honorific title, “Ghazi” (Holy Warrior)
which was given to him by the Nationalist Assembly. However, in the years that
followed the end of the war, Mustafa Kemal became increasingly firm in his
belief that the difficulties the Ottoman Empire suffered in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries were caused by its failure to take part in the scientific and
industrial development of the West. And for this he placed the blame squarely
on Islam. In the 1920s, he turned vehemently against all religion, orchestrated
an all-out effort to eradicate the impact of Islam and Islamic institutions in the
new state and made sure that secularism was enshrined as a founding principle
of the republic. The radicalism of this new orientation ushered in a thorough
soul-searching and a persistent debate about the place of religion in modern
Turkey, and this discussion continues to occupy a central place in the politics of
Turkey today.
Countering the pull of Asia and Islam on Turkish nationalism was the
attraction of the West whose ideals and institutions had become lodestars for the
nationalist leaders. In the minds of Atatürk and his colleagues, there was no
doubt that Western civilization provided the only acceptable model of progress,
and the positive sciences the only means of getting there. Ironically, this new
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orientation implied that in order to move forward, the new nation would have to
turn its back not only on religion but also on its newly discovered history in
Central Asia. For a while, in order to justify such a complete turn away from the
east, some writers put forth and defended, at considerable cost to historical and
archeological accuracy, the idea that Anatolia had always been the cradle not
only of Turkish but all civilizations.44
Over the years, the nationalist leaders on both sides have compensated for
the ambiguities that had marred the foundations of their respective ideologies
by assuming a particularly rigid and intolerant stand on all issues that involved
their history and their relationship to each other. It was feared that any
compromise would expose the weakness that lies at the core of both Greek and
Turkish nationalism and prevent the two nations from fulfilling their “historical
destinies”. It is not a long road from this uncompromising rigidity to the
justification of violence and destruction that was carried out in the name of
these ideologies in and around Izmir.
4. INTRUDERS
No analysis of the western Anatolian catastrophe would be complete without
referring to the outsiders who carried out most of the killings and brought about
the physical destruction of this region. On the Greek side, the troops who
occupied, attempted to govern, and, in their retreat, destroyed many of the
towns in the interior came for the most part from Greece.45 The bands of local
Greeks who joined the Greek army were on the margins of the social and
economic networks in Anatolia and were attracted by the messianic-nationalist
rhetoric of the Greek army. 46
Until a properly disciplined Turkish army was put together in 1921,
armed irregulars (efes, çetes, zeybeks) served as the backbone of the resistance
against the Greeks in western Anatolia..47 Even after the centrally organized
army seized control, the operations, these bands continued to operate as an
auxiliary force, and they played a key role in retaking Izmir. For both sides,
then, victory was contingent on the performance of large numbers of groups
who had no interest in the civic and economic networks in the region. Here I
will touch on only those who helped the Turkish side, since they ended up
playing the decisive role in how the history of Izmir and western Anatolia
unfolded in these crucial years.
The origins of the armed irregulars who joined the nationalist forces were
diverse. There were draft dodgers, tax evaders, and petty criminals among them.
But a great many of them originated from among the tribal communities who
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had been moved from the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire as part of
the state's recurrent campaigns of settling nomadic groups. The first of these
campaigns was organized at the end of the seventeenth century and they became
increasingly more comprehensive as the imperial administration acquired the
features of a modern state in the following centuries. But moving these groups
and even granting them land did not always ensure that they would abandon
their old ways and settle. Most of them continued their pastoral and nomadic
lives in their new environment combining them with some farming that they
usually incorporated into their annual cycles of migration.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, as the Ottoman state pressed
them for more taxes and for military service, these tribes became even more
rebellious. In addition to various forms of passive resistance which they had
always utilized, they started to organize and support armed units to rob
merchants, kidnap wealthy individuals for ransom, and collect protection fees
from caravans.48  The Ottoman army organized a number of campaigns in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century to punish these çetes and restore the
authority of the central administration in the countryside. But the advantage in
these encounters lay with the brigands who were organized in smaller units,
dispersed in the terrain, and had created a network of support for themselves.
On those rare occasions when the Ottoman army captured a famous bandit, he
was punished in the most emphatic way so that others would desist from
following or helping such individuals and their followers. 49 As an alternative
measure, the government relocated Kurds and Circassians in an attempt to use
them in suppressing these groups in western Anatolia.  But it soon became
apparent that these new arrivals were no more willing to go along with the
directives of the state than the previous tribes who had been settled there.
After the Balkan Wars, as the Ottoman Empire drifted into World War I,
the government abandoned all pretense of seeking to impose order in the
hinterland of Izmir. The anarchy that ensued enticed even more people to take
to the mountains in order to pursue a life of banditry. In addition to the Muslim
outsiders such as the Circassians, Tatars, and Kurds, there were also a large a
number of Greek bandits partaking in the fruits of the general lawlessness in
Anatolia. During these early years, none of the bandit groups paid much
attention to questions of national or religious affiliation in choosing either their
friends or their prey.
As they drew the Greek army across western Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal’s
forces made extensive use of these bandit groups who had been roaming the
countryside. This was, perhaps, inevitable. The Ottoman army had been fighting
on many fronts continuously since 1911; it had suffered a series of defeats and
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had officially been demobilized by the armistice in 1919. By the time the
nationalist effort was getting organized, there was but a skeleton left of this
once formidable fighting force. When the Greek army entered Aydin in 1919,
all that remained to defend that city were 10 officers, 43 soldiers, 46 pack
animals, and 2 cannon batteries.50 The resources of the irregular troops, on the
other hand, were formidable. Most of them had stayed out of the war and had
used the years of turmoil and conflict to enrich and arm themselves and their
followers. By force, intimidation, and offering protection, they had built for
themselves a network of support among the villagers and nomadic tribes. The
nationalist leaders were aware of the risks involved in relying too heavily on
these groups.51 In addition to being poorly trained and lacking discipline, they
had resisted all efforts at being incorporated into the regular army that was
rebuilt after 1920. The fears of the nationalist lawmakers proved to be justified
in that several of the bandits rebelled openly against the nationalists, and one
even went over to the Greek side with his three thousand men, four cannons,
and four hundred machine guns.52 In many cases, however, in return for their
support, the nationalists gave the bandit leaders a free hand in expanding their
activities, raiding the cities, robbing the urban population, and especially in
confiscating the properties of the fleeing Christians.
Needless to say, their service during the war improved the image of the
çetes significantly in Turkey. For example, Mustafa Kemal invited 400
followers of one of the more notorious bandits, Demirci Mehmet Efe, to Ankara
during the war and gave him the rank of colonel in the Turkish army.53 In the
years that followed the final victory of the nationalist forces, çetes would be
celebrated as romantic heroes and the veteran zeybeks would become permanent
fixtures in parades and ceremonies marking national holidays.
5. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE
There is no doubt that without the presence of these outsiders, neither Izmir nor
its interior would have been destroyed, at least not to the extent that they were.
Yet, the fact remains that no matter how weak they might have been, neither the
nationalist government nor its army was very effective or interested in
preventing the persecution of Greeks and Armenians or protecting these
communities at a moment when such protection was sorely needed. After all,
Mustafa Kemal himself was in Izmir while the city was burning and he even had
to move from his headquarters on the waterfront to the home of his future wife
in Göztepe when the fire came too close. On the journey that had to pass
through the entire city, it was feared that “the waves of panic-stricken people
would overwhelm the Ghazi and smother him”.54
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Why, then, did the late-Ottoman and the early nationalist regime lose
interest in the terrible fate of the Greeks and Armenians? Was there a
preconceived plan of mass murder directed at Armenians and Greeks? Was
what happened in western Anatolia a part of this master plan, or, alternatively,
did the Ottoman and Turkish officials seize on these events that were beyond
their control and used them to realize their ultimate goal of ridding Anatolia of
Armenians and Greeks? If so, why? Was a racist ideology or sentiment behind
the commitment of these crimes or the failure to prevent them? These key
questions lie at the heart of the Ottoman Empire's fateful years. It is unlikely
that a reasonable conversation will take place among historians or that anything
resembling a consensus will emerge unless these questions are addressed in a
way that is perceived as fair by all parties to this discussion. The following
points, however, may provide a reasonable place to start such a conversation,
especially in relation to the Greeks and Armenians of Izmir.
It is quite clear that starting from the final decades of the nineteenth
century, the Ottoman, the Young Turk, and the nationalist administrations
became increasingly suspicious of the position and the aspirations of the Greek
and Armenian residents of the empire. The persecution of Muslims in the
Balkans after the Ottoman Russian War of 1877-78, shifting policies of the
great powers, and the uncertainties inherent in Turkish nationalism are some of
the factors that brought about this general mistrust. By the early decades of the
twentieth century, the Greeks and Armenians had become the "others" of
Turkish nationalism. The rhetoric the nationalist representatives used in some of
their deliberations in the Ankara Assembly leaves no doubt as to how these
communities had come to be perceived by them.55 In addition to this ideology,
which now advocated the creation of a homogeneous nation, the Young Turks
and their nationalist descendants also possessed a fledgling communication
network and a new secret police organization, the Teskilat-i Mahsusa, both of
which they used very effectively in remaking Anatolian society.56 Needless to
say, little room was left in this environment for those who believed that some
reconciliation might still be possible .57
Identifying the culprits and specifying the circumstances of the
destruction of Izmir will undoubtedly take much more research and
conversation among researchers.  In the meantime, it serves no historical
purpose to impute collective guilt or ascribe indiscriminate victimhood for an
entire people forever. When history is presented from a perspective that seeks to
justify either one of these points of view, it produces a distorted picture that
cannot do justice to the actual record of events.
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